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PRESENT BIAS AND CRIMINAL LAW
Richard H. McAdams*
Although “present bias” (or weakness of will, impulsiveness,
myopia, or bounded willpower) was flagged as an issue for legal examination by Tom Ulen and Russell Korobkin over a decade ago, the
concept has received insufficient attention in the legal field—and most
of that attention has focused on its implications for the regulation of
credit and savings. But, as demonstrated by this Article, the inconsistency of time preferences has wider implications, especially for criminal law. First, present bias may have significant implications for the
general deterrence of crime. Individuals with time-inconsistent preferences may give in to immediate temptations to offend, even though
they will not plan to exploit more distant opportunities to offend. To
create additional deterrence by exploiting the present bias, one must
either make the deferred costs of crime immediate or make the immediate benefits of crime deferred. For this reason, present bias heightens the importance of timing arrests closer to the commission of a
crime—which suggests overlooked benefits from undercover operations. It also increases the efficiency of private crime prevention when
these measures pose costs that occur contemporaneously with the
benefits of crime. Second, present bias explains addiction, otherwise
puzzling conditions of probation and parole, and the self-control mechanisms for dealing with addiction and tempting criminal behavior.
Preventative measures, whether imposed by the state as a condition of
probation and parole or imposed by the potential offender through
“self-exclusion,” work by preventing an individual from having the
opportunity to succumb to temptation.
One topic of behavioral economics that has received less attention
in law than I think it deserves is what is variously discussed as the problem of bounded self-control, weakness of will, impulsiveness, procrastination, myopia, akrasia, or the term I will use, “present bias.” The issue
is one of time-inconsistent preferences, sometimes modeled with “hyper-

* Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I thank Lee Fennell, Jonathan
Masur, Alan Schwartz, and Manuel Utset for generous and insightful comments on an earlier draft
and Ian Ayres for a valuable conversation on these topics. I also thank the John M. Olin Program in
Law and Economics for research support.
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bolic” discount rates as opposed to standard exponential discount rates.1
Lee Fennell recently summarized the extensive experimental literature
finding that “animals and people can experience preference reversals as a
pair of temporally separated choices draws nearer in time, even though
the relative values of the payoffs and the temporal distance between
them has not changed.”2 The time inconsistency typically pushes one to
abandon long-term preferences in favor of immediate gratification.3 For
example, “Prudence might prefer $105 after 366 days to $100 after 365
days but change her mind when the choice becomes one between $100
today and $105 tomorrow.”4 Discounting the future is rational, but rationality would imply a stable (exponential) discount rate, such that Prudence would either favor the $105 or the $100 in both cases. Various
theories seek to explain why individuals tend to exhibit this time inconsistency.5
In their classic article on behavioral economics,6 Tom Ulen and
Russell Korobkin flag the problem of present bias as an issue for law:
An implication of time-inconsistent discount rates is that “people
will always consume more in the present than called for by their
previous plans.” An individual might plan to save X percent of her
salary next year but then decide when she receives it that she prefers to spend it rather than save (thus making appropriate the cliché
that money can “burn a hole” in one’s pocket).7
Ulen and Korobkin focus on the implications of those time inconsistencies for tax and savings policy, where they argue weakness of will might
justify paternalistic savings programs like social security.8
This Article focuses instead on criminal law, where I think the behavioral insight has great value. I once had the distinct pleasure of coauthoring a paper with Tom Ulen on behavioral criminal law and econom-

1. Discount rates capture the degree to which an individual values future payoffs less than
present payoffs. We say the future is “discounted to present value.” Exponential discount rates express a function where each unit of delay diminishes the present value of a gain or loss by the same
degree. Hyperbolic discount rates express a function where early delays diminish the present value
much more than later delays. See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A
Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 355–62 (2002); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and
Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 446–51 (1997).
2. Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 91, 94 (2009).
3. A workaholic or ascetic might exhibit time inconsistency in the opposite direction, preferring
now to engage in some vacation or consumptive indulgence a year in the future, but always deferring
the vacation or indulgence when the time comes.
4. Fennell, supra note 2, at 94.
5. See a brief review of theories in M. Keith Chen & Alan Schwartz, Intertemporal Choice and
Legal Constraints 2–3 n.3 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Stud. in Law, Econ., & Pub. Pol., Research
Paper
No.
381,
Apr.
6,
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396333.
6. Or destined to be classic, if articles, like cars, require twenty years of aging before they can
achieve classic status. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
7. Id. at 1120 (footnotes omitted).
8. Id. at 1121; see also Chen & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 4–7, 15–17.
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ics where we very briefly discussed the relevance of willpower problems
to criminal law.9 Here, I wish to extend and complicate what Professor
Ulen and I had to say. I claim that present bias directs our attention to
the importance of the timing of an arrest to general deterrence, reveals
new advantages of undercover operations and the use of defensive force
and precautions by victims, explains otherwise puzzling conditions of
probation and parole, and offers important insights into the best policy
responses to the problem of addiction.
I.

THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON PRESENT-BIAS
AND CRIMINAL LAW

Other articles review the empirical and theoretical literature on inconsistent time preferences.10 Here I discuss the scant law and economics
literature that has applied the empirical and theoretical literature to
criminal law. Note two preliminary points:
First, many criminologists have stressed poor self-control or willpower problems as a key individual variable associated with crime.11 This
claim could result either from time inconsistency of the sort explored
here or from internally consistent but unusually high discount rates. Because criminal punishment is always deferred—it occurs, if at all, in the
future after the defendant has been apprehended and convicted—the
threat of punishment has less effect on those with high discount rates. It
might appear that my topic—present bias and criminal law—is the effect
of high discount rates on crime, but that is not the case. A person with
consistent but above average discount rates values the present over the
future more than most people, but that person is not biased toward the
present any more than a person who prefers pistachio to chocolate flavor
is biased towards pistachio. Economics treats the individual’s preference
as a measure of value, and how much one favors the present over the future is as much a matter of personal taste as anything else. Only when
the preference for the present is time inconsistent do we call it biased.
Here, we use the individual’s own preference for the future—preferring
$105 after 366 days to $100 after 365 days—to interpret the inconsistent
preference for $100 today over $105 tomorrow as biased.12 The literature
9. See Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics, in
CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 423–25 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009).
10. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 2; Frederick et al., supra note 1; Laibson, supra note 1; Ted
O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103 (1999); Ted
O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Procrastination on Long-Term Projects, 66 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
161 (2008).
11. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME
85–120 (1990); JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 430–37
(1985).
12. Of course, other interpretations are possible. One could accept the preference for immediate consumption and argue the other preferences are biased toward the future. I follow most theorists who have given persuasive arguments for using long-term preferences as the baseline, at least in
most cases.
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I review examines this phenomenon, which I hope to show has independent normative implications for criminal law.
Second, because behavioral biases or heuristics interact with each
other, a comprehensive analysis would consider present bias in combination with other relevant cognitive imperfections. Because punishment is
uncertain, it seems especially relevant to consider the confounding effects of loss aversion and ambiguity aversion.13 I focus solely on present
bias, however, leaving the more complete analysis to a later day. For the
present discussion, I assume neutrality regarding risk, loss, or ambiguity.
Potential offenders are therefore motivated by expected punishment, as
discounted to present value.
Now let us turn to the few papers offering economic models of willpower and crime. First is an article by Robert Cooter. Before much of
the relevant experimental literature existed, Cooter modeled the problem of impulsiveness or “akrasia.”14 Cooter’s model assumes there is
some fluctuation in an individual’s discount rate (or risk preferences; he
models everything described below for risk preferences and then notes
the parallel for time preferences). For each time period, an individual
draws a discount rate from a probability distribution of discount rates for
that individual. The farther from one’s mean preference for the future,
the lower the probability one draws a particular discount rate. Thus,
there will be a set of decisions where most of an individual’s possible
time preferences will cause the individual to favor the future over the
present. Yet, where the individual with low probability draws an unusually high discount rate, the individual “lapses” by favoring immediate
consumption over the future for the same set of decisions.15
Cooter’s akrasia model is episodic in a way that differs from later
models of hyperbolic discounting. If Prudence has hyperbolic discount
rates, she might always prefer $105 in 366 days to $100 in 365, days but
will also always prefer $100 today to $105 tomorrow. A person could be
consistently inconsistent. In Cooter’s model, at any given moment, a
person has fully consistent (exponential) time preferences over all time
periods, but from moment to moment, those preferences change according to mood. Thus, a person who usually prefers both (1) $105 in 366
days over $100 in 365 days and (2) $105 tomorrow to $100 today, may on
occasion lapse and prefer the opposite—the $100 sooner over the $105
later across both time periods (and any other time periods separated by
one day).
Cooter applies his model to the decision to commit a crime (or tort).
Where one’s discount rate fluctuates, one may “lapse” into committing
the crime because the benefits from crime are enjoyed immediately,
13. See McAdams & Ulen, supra note 9, at 417–23.
14. See Robert D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts and Crimes: Towards an Economic Theory of the Will, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 149 (1991).
15. Id. at 150–54.
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while the potential sanctions are delayed. One implication Cooter draws
is that ex ante regulation, imposing small sanctions for risking harm, will
generate more deterrence than ex post regulation, “imposing large sanctions for harm after it occurs.”16 He apparently means that the closer in
time the punishment is to the behavior the punishment seeks to deter,
the less vulnerable deterrence is to fluctuating time preferences. When
Tom Ulen and I briefly discussed the implications of present bias for
criminal law, we similarly said it might justify criminal law’s frequent use
of ex ante regulation.17 I shall question, or at least complicate, these
claims below.
In their influential paper on behavioral law and economics, Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler (JST) briefly address the
issue they label “bounded willpower.”18 JST note the relevance of
“bounded willpower” to criminal law: “A central feature of much criminal behavior is that the benefits are immediate, while the costs (if they
are incurred at all) are spread out over time—often a very long time.”19
Not only are the temporally distant parts of a long prison term heavily
discounted, but they are particularly discounted when compared to the
immediate rewards of offending. JST also mention the problem of addiction, where they endorse Mark Kleiman’s idea of a complex system of
“coerced abstinence” for addicts on probation or parole.20 I offer some
more detailed remarks on addiction and probation below.
Recently, Manuel Utset gave present bias the extended treatment it
deserves.21 Utset stresses the problem of procrastination. In the above
example, Prudence chooses $100 today over $105 tomorrow even though
she prefers $105 in 366 days over $100 in 365 days. Now let us assume
that Prudence has to take action to receive the $105 and that the action
costs $100 one day before she will receive the $105. The same problem
emerges: Prudence may decide it is worthwhile to take an action in 365
days that will then cost her $100 in order to receive $105 in 366 days, but
when 365 days elapse, she prefers not to engage in the action and doesn’t
receive the $105. She says: “I’ll do it tomorrow,” but makes the same de16. Id. at 154.
17. See McAdams & Ulen, supra note 9, at 423–24.
18. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1471 (1998). JST place “bounded willpower” alongside “bounded rationality” and “bounded
self-interest,” which together comprise the findings of behavioral economics.
19. Id. at 1538.
20. Id. at 1540.
21. See Manuel A. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals and Repeated Time-Inconsistent Misconduct, 44
HOUS. L. REV. 609 (2007) [hereinafter Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals]. Utset has applied the problem of
present bias to a variety of legal domains. See Manuel A. Utset, A Model of Time-Inconsistent Misconduct: The Case of Lawyer Misconduct, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (2005); Manuel A. Utset, The
Temporally Extended Family and Self-Control: An Essay for Lee E. Teitelbaum, 2006 UTAH L. REV.
107; Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: The Case of
Shareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329; see also Manuel A. Utset, Procrastination and the
Law, in THE THIEF OF TIME: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PROCRASTINATION 253 (Chrisoula Andreou
& Mark D. White eds., 2010).
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cision the next day. Utset thus defines procrastination as occurring when
a person concludes at Time 0 (T0) that some costly action is worth doing
at Time 1 (T1) to obtain benefits at Time 2 (T2), but at T1 does not do
the action only because the immediate costs loom larger when they are
immediate.22 He refers to the “short-term multiplier” that makes present
costs and benefits look larger than they appear from any other time
perspective.23
Utset demonstrates that time inconsistency can cause both crime
and compliance that would not otherwise occur. He identifies two situations of procrastination-induced crimes. One is where the law requires
some action with immediate costs and future benefits—such as the filing
of income tax returns, corporate disclosures, or changes in environmental
emissions.24 Thus, at T0 the individual decides that it is worthwhile to incur the costs of compliance at T1 and thereby avoid the expected sanctions at T2, but when T1 arrives, the short-term multiplier causes the
costs to loom larger (or, as I would put it, the future benefits are more
heavily discounted when being compared to immediate costs) and the individual offends. Thus, the individual procrastinates legal compliance.
Perhaps the more standard case is where the crime forbids some action,
the benefits of which are immediate while the costs are deferred.25 Thus,
at T0 the individual decides that it is not worthwhile to commit a criminal
act and receive benefits at T1, given the expected costs to be incurred at
T2. But at T1 the short-term multiplier makes the benefits loom larger
(or the future costs are more heavily discounted relative to immediate
benefits) when compared to the deferred costs and the individual offends.
Counterintuitively, Utset also identifies time-inconsistent obedience.26 Some crimes require an investment in advance of rewards. Imagine a complex embezzlement scheme, or what scam artists call a “long
con,” in which the offender requires a costly period of time to gain the
trust of the intended victim.27 Or imagine an art theft where no one will
pay for the stolen object until some time passes and the authorities are
no longer working as hard to find the thieves. In either example, an individual could decide at T0 that the investment in the crime at T1 is
worthwhile to achieve the benefits at T2, but when T1 occurs, the immediacy of costs causes extra discounting of future benefits and the individual procrastinates the crime.
From this model, Utset draws a number of implications. First, the
conventional model of deterrence is not precisely correct for individuals
22. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 21, at 626–42.
23. Id. at 645.
24. Id. at 644–45.
25. Id. at 644.
26. Id. at 665–68.
27. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 661–63 (2001) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000)).
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with inconsistent time preferences. As just explained, present bias may
cause individuals to commit more or less crime.28 Second, to influence
present-biased individuals who will otherwise commit more offenses,
there are policy implications other than the obvious one of increasing
expected sanctions (by increasing the probability of detection or the severity of punishment). It may be preferable in some cases to use the law
to reduce the immediate benefits of crime or increase immediate nonsanction costs.29 For example, Utset notes that casinos and banks often
keep employees separated from large amounts of cash, thus decreasing
the benefits of committing a theft.30 Defensive measures against crime
can be inefficient if they merely displace crime to a different victim.31
But Utset argues that even though defensive measures might seem inefficient because they seem so unlikely to stop a determined criminal, they
may be efficient because a present-biased criminal is not likely to search
very long for other opportunities to commit the crime.
Utset also suggests that law can efficiently exploit the present bias
in potential offenders. His example is Chicago’s Anti-Gang Loitering
ordinance, which plausibly increases the costs of drug transactions for
both buyers and sellers.32 More generally, conspiracy liability and other
forms of inchoate liability might increase the immediate nonsanction
costs (costs taken to lower the probability of detection) of preparing for
crime, especially for group crime. Utset posits that immediate liability
increases search costs for criminals looking for partners who are capable
of overcoming the collective action problems involved in joint crimes,
i.e., those who are trustworthy, competent, and willing to share an attractive amount of the joint surplus.
In the next Part, I extend the existing literature on present bias and
criminal law, in some cases disagreeing with some of the existing theoretical claims, such as this last claim by Utset.

28. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 21, at 656–65.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 659.
31. On displacement, see Walter Enders & Todd Sandler, What Do We Know About the Substitution Effect in Transnational Terrorism?, in RESEARCH ON TERRORISM: TRENDS, ACHIEVEMENTS
AND FAILURES 119, 131–32 (Andrew Silke ed., 2004); Evan Wood et al., Displacement of Canada’s
Largest Public Illicit Drug Market in Response to a Police Crackdown, 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1551,
1554–55 (2004). On the inefficiency of precautions against crime when they cause displacement, see
Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal Attempts: A Victim-Centered
Perspective, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 309–10 (1996); Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent
Theft: Private Versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 123, 131–32 (1991). By
contrast, if the defensive measures are unobservable, such as a Lojack (a tracking device hidden in a
car in order to discover its location after a theft), then they cannot cause displacement and they are
more likely to be efficient. See Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from
Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 113 Q.J. ECON. 43, 44 (1998).
32. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 21, at 660.
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II. A FRESH TAKE ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF
PRESENT BIAS FOR CRIMINAL LAW
In this Part, I consider anew the relationship between present bias
and criminal law. I first address the effect of present bias on the analysis
of general deterrence, drawing somewhat different conclusions than Utset regarding the significance of crime definition and emphasizing the
role of arrests. Indeed, present bias points to a particular usefulness of
undercover operations and victim defensive force. Second, I consider
some implications for individual prevention of crime. The existence of
present bias gives an additional rationale for frequently observed conditions of probation and parole, as well as an innovative solution—”selfexclusion”—to the problem of addiction.
A. General Deterrence: The Narrow Significance of Crime Definition
and the Heightened Importance of Arrests and Undercover Operations
To see the implications of inconsistent time preferences for deterrence, we must first consider a model of crime with fully rational agents
who have time-consistent preferences. Only after we identify the relevance of time to a standard model can we isolate the policy significance
of a behavioral model. As explained below, some of the points that Utset makes about time-inconsistent misconduct turn out to be equally true
in a standard model.
Gary S. Becker first identified two key variables for general deterrence: the probability of detection and the severity of punishment.33 An
obvious third variable is time.34 Even with time-consistent, standard exponential discounting, the longer the delay between the crime and the
punishment, the greater the discounting of the punishment, and therefore, the weaker the deterrent (all else equal). The same is true regarding the timing of crime benefits. Even with time-consistent, standard exponential discounting, the longer the delay between the crime and the
benefits the crime produces, the greater the discounting of those benefits,
and therefore, the greater the deterrent (all else equal). Thus, the state is
more likely to deter a crime if it can accelerate the costs and/or delay the
benefits of crime. To be more precise, let us simplify greatly and assume
that all costs of the crime, including expected punishment, are incurred at
Time c (Tc) and all the benefits are accrued at Time b (Tb). When Tb
occurs first, we maximize deterrence by minimizing the gap between Tb

33. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
170 (1968).
34. See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal
Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 866
(2001).
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and Tc. When Tc occurs first, we maximize deterrence by maximizing
the gap between Tc and Tb. In general, we want to maximize (Tb–Tc).35
What do time-inconsistent preferences add to this point? First, if all
the factors are in the immediate present, then the present bias applies
equally to costs and benefits and therefore has no net effect.36 Second, if
the crime is one where the costs and benefits are both deferred, it is possible there is some effect,37 but there is no “short-term multiplier.” When
all the factors are in the future, though separated in time, if the future
costs deter the crime at one time period, it will do so at any other time
period; the individual will never decide to begin committing the offense
and will be deterred, notwithstanding the individual’s present bias. Thus,
the present bias has its main effect in the remaining cases: (1) when the
benefits of crime are in the immediate present and the costs are deferred,
and (2) when the costs of crime are in the immediate present and the
benefits are deferred. The former case produces what Utset calls timeinconsistent misconduct, while the latter produces time-inconsistent
compliance where the individual procrastinates misconduct.
Thus, to create additional deterrence by exploiting the present bias,
as distinguished from exploiting ordinary discounting, the options are
limited to changes that occur in the “present.” One must either make deferred costs immediate or make immediate benefits deferred. For present
bias (as distinguished from high discount rates), it will not help merely to
accelerate the timing of costs or delay the timing of benefits if the costs
nonetheless remain in the future, still to be incurred after the benefits.
Now consider how the state might manipulate the timing of expected costs and benefits to exploit the present bias so as to deter crime.
The timing of punishment may seem more relevant to policy than the
timing of benefits because the state obviously has more control over
when it punishes than when the criminal receives the private benefits of
crime. But Utset makes the point that crime definition can affect the timing of criminal benefits—his example is conspiracy.38 Suppose there is
some crime (e.g., bank robbery) that requires joint action because no

35. The expression assumes that we express time in a numerical continuum where later times
have larger numbers.
36. Nonsanction costs of crime are sometimes immediate, such as the risk of a victim retaliating
or the danger of falling from a second-story window a burglar aims to enter. But part of the sanction
costs is always delayed—e.g., the last day of incarceration for the sentence one gets. Thus, the full
costs of a crime are never all immediate. The purpose of the counterfactual statement in the text is
merely conceptual clarification.
37. With hyperbolic discounting, the special allure of the present heightens the difference between “now” and “later,” but could thereby diminish the difference between “later” and “much later.”
If so, then present bias could actually decrease the degree to which “much later” factors are discounted compared to “later” factors. If the benefits of a crime are incurred “later,” but the expected
punishment is incurred “much later,” present bias might increase deterrence.
38. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 21, at 668–71.

MCADAMS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

110

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

7/21/2011 11:44 AM

[Vol. 2011

single person can succeed. The fact that it is a crime merely to agree to
commit a crime39 (e.g., enter a bank robbery conspiracy)
increases the immediate costs of organizing conspiracies, because
potential members may want to limit their interactions with each
other until they are sure that they would benefit from joining. This,
in turn, increases search and coordination costs and, concomitantly,
the potential that one or more co-conspirators may procrastinate
following through.40
Note that Utset’s argument is independent of the severity of sanctions.
He is not making the obvious point that conspiracy liability may increase
deterrence by increasing the total sanction for the conduct. Utset is instead arguing that conspiracy liability increases the conspirator’s private
search and coordination costs.
To evaluate the argument, consider first the effect of search costs on
those with time consistent preferences. Increasing costs may increase deterrence if it delays how long the crime takes to complete. Suppose I
start trying to find a bank robbery partner at T0, and without conspiracy
law, suppose that I find a partner at T1 and commit the robbery at T2.
With conspiracy law, searching is more difficult and I find a partner only
at T2 and commit the crime at T3. At T0, I rationally discount the benefits at T3 more than the benefits at T2. Thus, someone with timeconsistent preferences is more likely to be deterred from committing
bank robbery by the fact that the law prohibits the agreement to commit
a bank robbery.
Utset’s point, however, is different. It is simply that the higher
search costs are incurred immediately and therefore magnified by the
present bias (more precisely, the future gains are more heavily discounted when compared to immediate costs). More generally, some
crimes naturally have the structure such that some costs are incurred before any benefits. The criminal must invest in the crime. When that is
true, anything the government does to increase the immediate costs will
exert a magnified deterrent effect due to present bias. In such cases, procrastination will work against crime. And one thing that increases immediate costs is the fact that sanctions for criminal preparation will cause
criminals to incur extra costs in making their preparation to avoid detection.
There is, however, a gap in this argument. It is not clear why the
threat of delayed sanctions can induce someone with present bias to incur immediate extra costs in preparing to offend. Utset contemplates
that offenders seeking crime partners can take high or low precautions.
39. Some jurisdictions require not just an agreement but an “overt act” in furtherance of the
agreement. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schoff, 911 A.2d 147, 160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). But where it
is required, the overt act requirement is easily met, as it can be an act that would by itself be innocuous. See, e.g., United States v. Eucker, 532 F.2d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that even silence can
be an overt act).
40. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 21, at 670–71.
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High precautions are more costly but are also more likely to screen out
incompetent or untrustworthy partners who will raise the probability of
detection. Without conspiracy liability, one can always back out of the
conspiracy (and avoid criminal sanctions) if one later determines that
one’s partners are not suitable. So one chooses low and cheap precautions before starting. With the crime of conspiracy, however, one incurs
liability immediately and one therefore wishes to assess the suitability of
potential partners up front. So one chooses high and costly precautions.
Thus, conspiracy law appears to increase the potential offender’s immediate costs.
Yet the increased costs are illusory because the formal punishment
for conspiracy is delayed rather than immediate. Why would the offender who has a present bias incur precautionary costs early on in order to
avoid nondeterring criminal sanctions down the road? If the offender is
not deterred from committing a crime by the deferred substantive sanctions, then it is not clear why conspiracy sanctions—also deferred—will
do any better at inducing the offender to take immediately costly extra
precautions. For example, suppose there is no conspiracy liability and a
potential offender with present bias—Dennis—prefers to take low precautions to acquire crime partners at T0 to commit a substantive offense
at T1, despite the risk of sanctions that might be imposed at T2. Now the
state imposes conspiracy liability. Utset’s point is that Dennis will have
to incur new costs at T0 in the formation of the conspiracy—taking
greater care in the selection of crime partners—to avoid the sanctions at
T2.41 But why bother? If Dennis was originally willing to offend with
low levels of precaution, he will still be willing to offend with low level of
precautions, despite conspiracy liability, as long as the conspiracy punishment is as delayed as the punishment for the substantive offense (to
T2).42 If Dennis’s present bias is sufficiently strong to prevent the sanctions at T2 from deterring him at T0, then they will also be insufficient to
induce him to incur precautionary costs at T0. So conspiracy liability
does not raise his immediate costs.
Imagine, however, a different interpretation of Utset’s argument:
not that conspiracy liability makes the offender choose to incur immediate new costs in selecting a crime partner, but that it forces the offender
to incur higher costs by shrinking his or her opportunity set. For example, suppose that conspiracy liability deters some potential offenders with
time consistent preferences. The effect is to leave present-biased offenders with fewer potential partners. On this reading of Utset, conspiracy
41. Id.
42. As noted above, the analysis assumes that the total sanctions are the same (i.e., that the penalty for the substantive offense before the state creates conspiracy liability is equal to the penalty for
the substantive offense plus conspiracy once it is created). Utset is not claiming that conspiracy liability works on present-biased individuals merely because it raises the total sanction. Though conspiracy
does have that effect, one cannot uniquely justify conspiracy liability on this basis because the state
could produce the same deterrence by instead raising sanctions for the substantive offense.
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liability deters impulsive offenders by depriving them of nonimpulsive
partners. Thus, the search costs they must incur rise and their present
bias magnifies the size of those costs, causing them to procrastinate their
offense. Of course, this theory seems highly contingent. With enough
impulsive offenders, they will always be able to find other offenders willing to enter a conspiracy.
Consider therefore an alternate and more general explanation for
the importance of crime definition to impulsive offenders. Moving the
trigger for liability back in the course of criminal conduct does not itself
address present bias because the actual criminal sentence will never be
immediate. But what is immediate is the threat of arrest. The arrest imposes significant costs—a loss of liberty, dignity, and possibly property—
which may be immediately followed by detention pending trial.43 Arrests
vary in how costly they are for the person arrested, but consider the Supreme Court’s description of a “normal” constitutional arrest:
Atwater’s arrest was surely “humiliating,” . . . but it was no more
“harmful to . . . privacy or . . . physical interests” than the normal
custodial arrest. She was handcuffed, placed in a squad car, and
taken to the local police station, where officers asked her to remove
her shoes, jewelry, and glasses, and to empty her pockets. They
then took her photograph and placed her in a cell, alone, for about
an hour, after which she was taken before a magistrate, and released on . . . bond. The arrest and booking were inconvenient
and embarrassing to Atwater, but not so extraordinary as to violate
the Fourth Amendment.44
Malcolm Feeley famously wrote, “The Process is the Punishment.”45
That is understandably a warning that we thoughtlessly impose a lot of
“punishment” on people before we determine that they deserve any. But
it also has this implication: present bias always works against the deterrent effect of the state’s formal punishment, which is deferred, but does
not work against the deterrent effects of arrest, once the threat of arrest
becomes immediate. Instead, when threat of arrest is immediate and the
crime’s benefit is deferred, present bias causes heavier discounting of the
43. That the costs are probabilistic should not matter—there is no reason that the person with
present bias will ignore immediate costs just because they are uncertain.
44. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354–55 (2001) (citation omitted); see also United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (“An arrest . . . is a serious personal
intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is guilty or innocent. Although an arrestee cannot
be held for a significant period without some neutral determination that there are grounds to do so, . . .
no decision that he should go free can come quickly enough to erase the invasion of his privacy that
already will have occurred.” (citations omitted)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968) (speaking of
a frisk that is less intrusive than an arrest: “[I]t is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands
raised, is a ‘petty indignity.’ It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict
great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.” (footnote omitted)).
45. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT (1979).
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future criminal benefits, which magnifies the deterrent threat of arrest.
Thus, moving back the line of criminal liability potentially makes some of
the expected costs immediate and exploits not just the ordinary discounting of future costs, but the special time-inconsistent discounting of future
costs weighed against immediate benefits.
Of course, one assumption here is that the police actually make
some arrests for the early crime. This is not necessarily the case. When
the police discover evidence of a conspiracy’s formation, they might routinely wait for the members of the conspiracy to commit substantive
crimes—like completing the crime that is the object of the conspiracy—
before making any arrests. Police delay increases the number of crimes
committed by the members of the conspiracy and thus the ultimate level
of punishment. One policy implication of present bias, however, is that
police should sometimes make immediate arrests so that potential conspirators will contemplate immediate costs to their entering a conspiracy.
Even though immediate arrests may decrease the ultimate severity of the
sanction imposed, they offset this effect by creating an expected cost at
or well before the potential offender expects to receive any benefit from
the crime.46
A second implication is to favor defining the crime of conspiracy so
as not to include an “overt act” beyond the criminal agreement, thus
pushing back the first moment of possible arrest to the earliest time.
There are, of course, important political concerns about defining serious
crime at such an early stage because it extends the power of government
to punish back to a point when the actor has yet to do something significant.47 These political concerns may, on balance, still justify the need for
an overt act, but my point is that present bias offers one new factor favoring the definition of crime at an earlier point.
The existence of present bias also reveals a special and neglected
value of undercover operations.48 Note first that Utset discusses undercover operations to raise a special concern with them—i.e., that police
will lure people into crime only by exploiting their present biases.49 No
doubt Utset is right that police can create the appearance of immediate
benefits to crime (or a delay in the expected costs), which can induce a
person who is present biased to commit an offense (1) that individuals
46. The optimal police strategy also depends on the risks posed by leaving the conspirators at
large for a longer period of time. Although the police may keep known conspirators under surveillance, there are always risks to leaving them free, i.e., that they will commit new crimes that cause substantial harm and/or that they will detect the surveillance and flee the jurisdiction. Thus, even if the
deterrent effect of delaying arrests and increasing punishment severity outweighs the deterrent effect
of immediate arrests magnified by present bias, the latter point may, in combination with the risks of
delay, make immediate arrests the efficient police strategy.
47. See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 270–77 (1968).
48. See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 107 (2005) (discussing the advantages of undercover operations and the need for an
entrapment defense to curb abuses).
49. See Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 21, at 671–72.
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with consistent time preferences would avoid committing, and (2) that
the present-biased person would usually avoid committing because that
individual uses some self-commitment mechanism the undercover police
officer evades. But note that the police, in manipulating time preferences and avoiding self-commitment mechanisms, might merely be mimicking the behavior of private citizens who often lure other private citizens into crime by exploiting their present bias and evading their selfcontrol mechanisms. Yet it is not a defense to crime that one’s coconspirator exploited another’s present bias by appealing to the immediate benefits of crime. Thus, it is not obvious why it should be a defense
if the police do the same. As in all subjects related to the entrapment defense, the issue is complex.50
There is one other factor to consider. Even if present bias creates
special concerns about police manipulation, it also reveals a new deterrent advantage of undercover operations. The well-understood benefit
of such tactics is that they increase the probability of detection. The
novel and neglected point is that undercover operations often move the
point of arrest from a time after which the offender incurs benefits from
the crime to a time during which or before the offender expects to incur
the benefits. Without sting operations and in situations where contemporaneous surveillance is impossible, the offender runs only the risk that
police investigation will eventually expose the offender to criminal punishment. The perpetrator gains at T1 from committing the crime at T1,
but still risks arrest at T2. With sting operations, however, the offender
runs the risk that the people with whom the offender is illegally transacting are the police and will arrest him or her the moment the crime is
complete—after receipt of the money, but before the offender can spend
it (or after receipt of the drugs or guns, but before they can be used).
The perpetrator faces immediate losses as well as gains from committing
a crime at T1.
Advancing the threat of arrest to an earlier point in time enhances
the deterrent threat for anyone (because the costs of arrest are subject to
less discounting), however, moving up the threat of arrest to the same
moment at which the criminal benefits are enjoyed has a particular effect
on those with present bias. Facing an immediate gain from crime, a
present-biased person may be undeterred by a police investigation posing a high probability of eventual arrest, but would be deterred by the
low probability of a sting operation threatening immediate arrest.
We can now extend this point about arrests to explain the argument
that Ulen and I,51 and Cooter,52 made about the ex ante nature of regulatory crimes. Consider the problem of negligently caused physical injury
and death. A manufacturer or distributor of food or drugs needs to take
50.
51.
52.

See McAdams, supra note 48, at 116.
See McAdams & Ulen, supra note 9.
See Cooter, supra note 14, at 154.
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various precautions, such as those to ensure sanitary conditions and the
proper labeling of the product. Suppose that the state decides that the
tort system is not fully adequate to deter negligence in this context and
therefore adds criminal sanctions. There are two approaches. One is to
wait until the harm occurs and then impose a penalty on those who negligently caused the harm. The second is to identify acts that create the
risk of physical harm and impose liability on them. The latter might include making it a crime to hold food in warehouses infested with vermin
or to transport drugs with inaccurate expiration labels, whether or not
anyone is harmed as a result. These regulations are, respectively, ex post
and ex ante.
Ex ante regulation obviously has some deterrence advantages for
people with time-consistent preferences—moving up the period of time
when one incurs costs means that those costs will be less heavily discounted. But the ex ante regulation exploits present bias only if the
criminal act risks costs contemporaneous with benefits. If a manager
gains immediately from not spending money on controlling vermin in the
warehouse or from allowing labeling inaccuracies, then the law could
prevent the manager from overvaluing those benefits relative to the costs
by making the costs equally immediate. What is perhaps surprising is
how limited this possibility is. Again, mere formal liability does not impose immediate costs; only the immediate threat of arrest does. But
quite likely, there is no threat of immediate arrest because the police are
not immediately present at the scene of a regulatory offense. Instead,
the police must investigate, and the prosecutor typically seeks a grand
jury indictment prior to arrest. Undercover operations or surreptitious
surveillance could create a threat of immediate arrest, but my observation is that such tactics are rare or nonexistent for regulatory offenses
(other than for selling alcohol to minors). The implication is that police
might generate some significant deterrent gains by occasionally running
undercover operations or using confidential informants to target regulatory offenses, thereby creating the threat of an arrest immediately after
the offense occurs.
Finally, let us reconsider private defensive measures against crime—
such as safes, burglar alarms, security guards, and guard dogs. I noted
Utset’s analysis above, explaining how present bias can increase the efficiency of private precautions against crime.53 If some individuals offend
only because they encounter a criminal opportunity for immediate gain,
then defensive measures that remove that opportunity may deter rather
than displace crime. I agree with this observation, but I want to also note
the divergent effects of different types of defensive measures. Some defensive measures merely increase the probability the offender will eventually be apprehended and punished—such as security cameras or dye

53.

See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.

MCADAMS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

116

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

7/21/2011 11:44 AM

[Vol. 2011

packets the bank places in stolen money. These measures increase the
probability of formal sanctions, but those sanctions remain deferred. By
contrast, some defensive measures create a risk of harm to the offender
at the same time the offender hopes to experience criminal gains—
security guards might make private arrests; guard dogs or barbed wire
might injure the offender. For anyone, but especially for potential offenders with present biases, defensive measures that impose costs prior
to or contemporaneous with the benefits of crime, are the most likely to
deter crime.54
An important example is the risk that the victim will use defensive
force. The law presumptively permits an individual to use otherwise unlawful force to defend against a crime, including in some cases deadly
force.55 The defensive resistance the robber contemplates includes being
punched or shot, at or before the moment when the robber expects to
gain the victim’s money. Of course, defensive force also affects rational
offenders with entirely consistent time preferences because it both raises
the expected costs of crime and decreases the expected benefits (given
that defensive force may succeed in stopping the robbery). The point is
simply that, for individuals with present bias, these effects are stronger
because they are immediate. Moments away from the robbery, the robber may hyperbolically discount the deferred sanctions, but not the immediate risk of defensive force.56
B.

1.

Individual Prevention: Probation and Parole Conditions,
Addiction, and Self-Exclusion

Conditions for Probation and Parole

Legal scholars have not examined perhaps the most obvious way the
government attempts to correct willpower problems to prevent crime: by
the conditions judges place on probation and parole. For instance,
judges sometimes sentence offenders to probation instead of incarceration and the prison sentence hangs “suspended” over the offender, ready
to be imposed if the offender is caught committing some other crime (as
well as sanctions for the new offense). Those who are sentenced to prison may be released early on parole, with the same threat of being returned to prison to complete their sentence if they commit another crime
(again, in addition to sanctions for the new offense). In these situations,
54. I make no claim about overall efficiency.
55. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 539–50 (4th ed. 2003) (§ 10.4 on “selfdefense”).
56. Besides supporting the doctrine of self-defense, a policy implication might be to support
right-to-carry laws on the theory that arming citizens will deter crime, as famously claimed in JOHN R.
LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS 94–96
(1998). But there is substantial evidence against this hypothesis. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (2003); Mark
Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086 (2001).
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judges are authorized to place additional conditions on probation or parole other than the requirement of not committing new crimes.57 To
some extent, the same is true of bail—the judge can release an individual
pending trial but impose conditions on release.58
Common conditions include that one stays in school or maintains
employment, avoids the vicinity of the victim, does not associate with
persons with a criminal record, does not possess a firearm (even one that
would otherwise be lawful to possess), and does not use alcohol or enter
a drinking establishment.59 Special conditions are provided for those who
57. Federal law, for example, authorizes courts to set, as a condition of probation, the requirement that the probationer:
(4)

work conscientiously at suitable employment or pursue conscientiously a course of study
or vocational training that will equip him for suitable employment;

(5)

refrain, in the case of an individual, from engaging in a specified occupation, business, or
profession bearing a reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting the offense, or engage in such a specified occupation, business, or profession only to a stated
degree or under stated circumstances;

(6)

refrain from frequenting specified kinds of places or from associating unnecessarily with
specified persons;

(7)

refrain from excessive use of alcohol . . . ;

(8)

refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon;

(9)

undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment, including treatment
for drug or alcohol dependency, as specified by the court, and remain in a specified institution if required for that purpose; . . . [or]

(13) reside in a specified place or area, or refrain from residing in a specified place or
area . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) (2006). The law also authorizes federal courts to set conditions other than those
specified, and the courts have used this discretion. See United States v. A-Abras Inc., 185 F.3d 26, 31
(2d Cir. 1999) (stating that “the conditions of supervised release imposed by trial courts have run the
gamut” and listing examples); see also The Legality of Innovative Alternative Sanctions for Nonviolent
Crimes, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1944, 1949 (1998) (“[A] growing number of judges across the country have
been imposing innovative conditions on nonviolent offenders.”).
58. In the federal system, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 authorizes the trial judge to impose conditions on release, in addition to noncommission of additional crimes, in order to ensure appearance at
trial and protect “the safety of any other person [and] the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (2006).
Such conditions include that the person . . .
(ii)

maintain employment, or, if unemployed, actively seek employment;

(iii) maintain or commence an educational program;
(iv) abide by specified restrictions on personal associations, place of abode, or travel;
(v)

avoid all contact with an alleged victim of the crime and with a potential witness who
may testify concerning the offense; . . .

(vii) comply with a specified curfew;
(viii) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon;
(ix) refrain from excessive use of alcohol . . .
(x)

undergo available medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment, including treatment for drug or alcohol dependency . . . .

§ 3142(c)(1)(B).
59. See,
e.g.,
Standard
Conditions
of
Parole,
W.
VA.
DIV.
CORR.,
http://www.wvdoc.com/wvdoc/ParoleServicesResources/StandardConditionsofParole/tabid/143/Defaul
t.aspx (last visited July 18, 2011).
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commit specific offenses or have behavioral problems. Those who have
embezzled may be forbidden from taking jobs that require handling
money or credit cards.60 Those who are addicted to drugs or alcohol may
be required to attend Alcoholics or Narcotics Anonymous meetings or to
enroll in some other counseling or treatment program. Those who commit crimes at night may be required to comply with a curfew.61 Others
may be required to stay in their home in “home detention.”
In some cases, probationers or parolees challenge conditions that
explicitly limit their exercise of constitutional rights. Because courts see
sufficient value in these conditions, the challenges usually fail. Courts
have upheld prohibitions on access to the Internet for those convicted of
sex offenses facilitated by the Internet,62 participation in lawful Ku Klux
Klan activities or mere presence in a Hispanic neighborhood for one
convicted of inciting race riots,63 and participation in lawful abortion protests for those convicted of unlawfully protesting by harassment and intimidation.64 In the last case, the court upheld the condition “[i]n order
to help insure [the convict] does not repeat her criminal conduct” because “her deeply held convictions regarding abortion” suggest “that if
she were permitted to protest at abortion clinics, she might not be able to
restrict her activities within lawful parameters.”65
One way to understand many of these conditions is that they try to
prevent a situation where the offender has an immediate option of reoffending. If an offender has embezzled from his or her employer, being
employed in another job with access to cash or credit cards offers the
immediate option of embezzling. If an offender associates with persons
with a criminal record, the offender may face an immediate opportunity
to enter a criminal conspiracy. If an offender assaults an individual the
offender hates, returning to the victim’s presence may offer the immediate temptation of assaulting the victim again. If an offender strongly
opposes abortion, then participation in a protest at an abortion clinic
may offer him or her the immediate opportunity for damaging clinic
property or threatening individuals seeking abortions.
In these cases, the condition of probation or parole removes an immediate temptation to reoffend. The question is why the threat of criminal sanctions would work to deter the individual from violating these
conditions if it would not also work directly to deter the subsequent
crime. If the threat of revocation deters embezzlement, then why forbid
the offender from taking a job handling cash or credit? If the threat of
60. See,
e.g.,
Conditions
of
Probation,
CLACKAMAS
CNTY.,
OR.,
http://www.co.clackamas.or.us/corrections/info.htm (last visited July 18, 2011).
61. See United States v. Asalati, 615 F.3d 1001, 1004, 1008–09 (8th Cir. 2010).
62. See United States v. Alvarez, 478 F.3d 864, 865–68 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Locke,
482 F.3d 764, 768–69 (5th Cir. 2007).
63. See Land v. State, 426 S.E.2d 370, 374 (Ga. 1993).
64. See United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995).
65. Id.
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revocation of parole or probation is a sufficient threat to stop the offender from assaulting a previous victim (or someone of the same race), then
why is it necessary to bar the offender from being in the presence of the
victim (or others of the victim’s race)? On the other hand, if the threat
of revocation is not sufficient to deter the subsequent assault or embezzlement, then why would it be sufficient to deter a violation of the condition of probation or parole?
One answer is that the individuals may have time-inconsistent preferences, which cause them to give in to immediate temptation to commit
crime, but not to give in to more distant temptations. For example, assume an offender motivated to reassault a prior victim decides at T0
whether to be, or avoid being, in the victim’s vicinity at T1. If the offender is in the victim’s vicinity at T1, the offender then decides at T1
whether to reassault the victim, knowing that punishment will result with
some probability at T2. Suppose initially that there is no condition of
probation or parole and assume that, at T0, when both the costs and
benefits of the crime are in the future, the offender is deterred and decides not to offend.
Having decided to refrain from another assault, but without a condition, will the offender avoid the victim? According to the present-bias
literature, the answer depends on whether the offender is naïve or sophisticated about his or her present bias.66 A sophisticated individual
with present bias anticipates its effects, but a naïve individual does not.
To illustrate, assume that Delores is present biased and sophisticated.
She knows at T0 that if she has the immediate opportunity to offend at
T1, she will take it. Because at T0 she also knows that she does not want
to offend at T1, given the expected costs at T2, the present-bias literature
predicts that Delores will seek some self-commitment device to deny herself the opportunity to act contrary to her T0 preferences.67 For a sophisticated present-biased offender like Delores, who faces the temptation of
reassaulting a prior victim, self-commitment might mean keeping a distance from the victim, thus preserving a time span between the offender’s
situation and the opportunity for another assault. Delores would therefore not oppose a probation condition that she avoid the victim’s location. The condition might not be necessary because sophisticated offenders will try to avoid the victim even without a condition. That said,
66. See, e.g., Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Self-Awareness and Self-Control, in TIME AND
DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 217, 217–21
(George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003).
67. An example of self-commitment is the alcoholic who takes the drug disulfiram (with the
brand name “antabuse”), which causes very unpleasant effects when someone taking the drug consumes even a small amount of alcohol. See Nat’l Ctr. for Biotechnology Info., Disulfiram, PUBMED
HEALTH (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0000726 (indicating that the
drug may have this effect for up to two weeks after the patient stops taking it). Thus, the drug forces
the issue of drinking into the future: one can quit the drug today to drink two weeks from today, but
without the possibility of drinking immediately, the alcoholic’s present bias does not operate. I return
to the subject of addiction below.
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such sophisticated offenders would prefer the condition if it makes it
even slightly less likely that they will commit a crime which, at T0, they
do not want to commit. In this case, the probation condition works as a
self-commitment device.
By contrast, let us suppose that Dennis is a naïve present-biased offender. Being naïve in this context means that Dennis is either unaware
of his present bias or is aware of it, but erroneously thinks he can overcome the bias “next time.” If Dennis is deterred at T0 by the expected
punishment at T2, he would erroneously predict that he will also be deterred at T1 when faced with an immediate opportunity to gain the benefits from offending. Being naïve, Dennis will see no benefit from keeping
temptation at bay—he has no reason to avoid the presence of a previous
victim (or a job where he can embezzle cash or an abortion protest where
he can damage clinic property) because Dennis believes the costs of offending will deter him even when he encounters an immediate opportunity. If Dennis feels unsusceptible to future opportunities to offend, then
he will not expect any punishment to result from his being placed in a
situation where he can immediately offend. In the assault scenario, the
problem is that Dennis might benefit from being in the victim’s presence
even without assaulting him or her (as by making the victim anxious or
visiting their shared children). So Dennis travels to the victim’s location
for a purpose other than assault but then is surprised when this results in
his giving into temptation and committing a new assault. The naïve offender opposes the condition of probation, feeling that it is unnecessary
and costly.
Does the condition of probation or parole change the calculus and
deter the naïve present-biased offender from traveling to the location of
the victim? Plausibly, yes—as long as obeying the condition keeps the
opportunity to commit the offense sufficiently in the future, temporally
removed from the offender’s situation at any given moment. Thus, assume that, at T0, Dennis cannot actually commit a new assault because
the victim is not present and he cannot arrive at the victim’s location until T1.68 When that is true, at T0, the benefits (as well as costs) of the offense are in the future and are therefore not subject to the present bias.
If so, and if Dennis is deterred from deciding at T0 to offend at T1 because of the sanctions at T2, then the condition of probation or parole
will also deter him at T0 from deciding to travel to the victim’s location
at T1 because of the sanctions at T2. The condition renders Dennis’s
naivety irrelevant—it no longer matters if the offender erroneously predicts that he will not commit another assault at T1 because the condition

68. To illustrate, suppose that Dennis lives and works several miles from the victim and has no
incentive to visit the victim’s location other than to engage the victim in a face-to-face interaction (for
criminal or noncriminal reasons). By contrast, if Dennis is an immediate neighbor of the victim, the
condition of staying out of the victim’s yard does not create any real temporal gap between the decision to offend and the offense.

MCADAMS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 5]

PRESENT BIAS AND CRIMINAL LAW

7/21/2011 11:44 AM

121

punishes the offender’s presence in the victim’s location regardless of
whether he commits a new assault. By deterring the offender from taking a necessary step towards the commission of a new assault, the condition deters the assault. Dennis will never put himself in a position to be
tempted to commit an impulsive crime.69
The condition potentially has a second effect: it can move up the
timing of the punishment because the offender can now be incarcerated
merely for going to the victim’s location at T1. Thus, there are expected
costs now at T1, which means that costs are less discounted than before.
This effect could explain the advantage of imposing a condition even for
someone with time-consistent preferences, which may render the
present-biased explanation unnecessary. But note how contingent this
explanation is: it depends on there being a realistic probability that the
police will show up to arrest the offender at T1, right as the offender appears on the scene with the victim. If, as is more realistic, the police wait
until T2 to detect a violation at T1, then the condition’s potential second
effect does not occur. Thus, present bias is a good explanation for many
conditions of probation or parole.
Finally, we can offer a similar account of these conditions with Cooter’s “akrasia” lapse model. Recall that Cooter imagines that a person’s
discount rate fluctuates from moment to moment (but at each moment is
consistent across time).70 Thus, a person might ordinarily be deterred at
T0 from later offending at T1 because of sanctions at T2. Because the
individual has consistent time preferences, expected sanctions at T2 also
deter the individual from offending at T1. Sometimes, however, the individual draws an unusually high discount rate. If that occurs at T0, the
individual might, for example, go to the victim’s presence with the intent
of assaulting him or her at T1. Of course, in the interval of time it takes
to travel to the victim’s location, the individual might draw a more average time preference and decide at T1 not to offend. Another possibility
is that the offender draws an average discount rate at T0 (under which it
is not rational to offend at T1), yet if the offender is in the victim’s presence at T1 (for some other reason), the offender may draw a high discount rate and lapse into crime.
Again, an offender’s behavior choice depends on whether the individual is naïve or sophisticated. A sophisticated offender does not know
if going to the victim’s location will lead to an offense. The sophisticated
offender knows there is a risk of offending, where the probability is determined by the probability that the offender will draw a high enough
discount rate to diminish the present value of expected sanctions to a
69. The analysis is simpler for one technologically inspired condition—the wearing of an electronic anklet during home arrest. The technology radically decreases the time required for police to
show up and make an arrest if the offender leaves home (or in other cases goes too near a restricted
location). If the police arrive soon enough, the costs of violating the condition are effectively immediate.
70. See supra notes 14–15.
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nondeterrent level. A naïve offender, in contrast, can be someone who
merely underestimates the probability of drawing such a discount rate.
In Cooter’s model, the condition of probation or parole also works
primarily to explain deterrence for naïve offenders. A sophisticated offender will reoffend only if the offender draws a high discount rate in two
consecutive time periods—for example, in T0, when deciding to travel to
the victim’s location, and T1, when deciding whether to assault the victim. Yet given these two draws, the condition will have no deterrent effect; the offender’s discount rates are too high for the T2 sanctions to deter at either stage. The naïve offender, on the other hand, might
reoffend only because the offender draws a high discount rate at T1
while in the presence of the victim. The naïve offender might decide at
T0 to travel to the victim’s location (or not to avoid it) because of an underestimation of the likelihood of drawing the kind of discount rate that
would cause the individual to offend. With the imposition of the condition, however, when the individual draws a low or average discount rate
at T0, the individual will avoid the victim’s location at T1.
In sum, the concept of present bias offers a useful understanding of
many conditions that courts routinely impose on probation, parole, and
bail. A closer look might support my conjecture that courts use such
conditions most commonly when the facts of the crime suggest that the
offender is subject to present bias.
2.

Addiction

Various theorists have used present bias to provide an intuitive
theory of addiction,71 in contrast to the Becker-Murphy theory of “rational” addiction.72 Addiction plausibly involves time inconsistency: a
person decides at T0 that the benefit of alcohol, tobacco, or heroin consumption at T1 is not worth the cost at T2. At T1, however, the present
bias causes the individual to discount more heavily the deferred costs, as
compared to the immediate benefits, and the individual succumbs to
temptation. For this reason an individual at T0 might decide to engage in
some form of self-commitment that denies himself or herself the opportunity to consume alcohol, tobacco, or heroin at T1.73 Such individuals
71. See George Ainslie, A Research-Based Theory of Addictive Motivation, 19 LAW & PHIL. 77,
81–85 (2000); Chrisoula Andreou, Making a Clean Break: Addiction and Ulysses Contracts, 22
BIOETHICS 25, 28–31 (2008); Warren K. Bickel & Lisa A. Marsch, Conceptualizing Addiction, Toward
a Behavioral Economic Understanding of Drug Dependence: Delay Discounting Processes, 96
ADDICTION 73, 76–81 (2001); Michael Louis Corrado, Addiction and the Theory of Action, 25
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 117, 119–20 (2006); Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1261, 1277 (2001); Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer,
Harmful Addiction, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 147, 150 (2007); Fernando S. Machado & Rajiv K. Sinha,
Smoking Cessation: A Model of Planned vs. Actual Behavior for Time-Inconsistent Consumers, 26
MARKETING SCI. 834, 847–49 (2007).
72. See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON.
675 (1988).
73. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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seek what is variously called a “Ulysses contract”74 or “self-exclusion,”75
which I discuss below.
Yet addiction is arguably something more than this simple inconsistency as we do not tend to use the term addiction to describe every
tempting behavior we later regret engaging in. Imagine that Ulysses repeatedly gives in to the temptation to watch a half-hour of bad television
instead of reading a good novel. He regrets his decision and seeks ways
to commit to novel reading, such as canceling his cable subscription.
Nonetheless, it seems odd or hyperbolic to say that Ulysses is literally
“addicted” to television. To explain the distinction in these cases, economists Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer introduce another variable.76 Gul and Pesendorfer use the term “compulsive” to refer to the
simple time inconsistency noted above: “[a]n individual is compulsive if
his choice differs from what he would have chosen had commitment been
possible.”77 What makes behavior addictive is that engaging in the compulsive behavior increases how compulsive the behavior is. Cocaine use
is addictive not merely because a person might at T0 choose against its
consumption at T1, yet still consume at T1 (absent a self-commitment
mechanism), but because the more one ingests, the more one will consume it absent self-commitment. “Hence, a harmful addiction is defined
as a widening of the gap between the individual’s choice and what [that
individual] would have chosen before experiencing temptation.”78
Thus, present bias helps to explain how people acquire and seek to
subsequently “break” addictions. One might try to justify criminal prohibitions of addictive behaviors—the use of cocaine and heroin or, in an
earlier day, alcohol and gambling—as self-commitment mechanisms, but
there are serious objections. First, the prohibitions apply even to those
individuals who do not seek to refrain from engaging in these behaviors.
Second, the law is not a very reliable commitment device, given that
present bias undermines the threat of deferred criminal punishment.
More promising on both counts, however, may be individualized
self-imposed mechanisms of commitment. For instance, Ian Ayres explores the possibility of commitment contracts by which individuals put
large amounts of money at risk in the event that they fail to lose weight
or quit smoking.79 Jim Leitzel explores the broad concept of “self74. See Andreou, supra note 71, at 25 (emphasis omitted).
75. Jim A. Leitzel, Self-Exclusion 2–3 (Apr. 6, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1126317.
76. See Gul & Pesendorfer, supra note 71, at 147.
77. Id. (emphasis omitted).
78. Id.
79. See IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET
THINGS DONE 57–61 (2010); see also Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 186, 190 (2003); Michael Abramowicz &
Ian Ayres, Compensating Commitments: The Law and Economics of Commitment Bonds That Compensate for the Possibility of Forfeiture (May 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1612396.
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exclusion,” which is now used in some places as a solution to problem
gambling.80 Some casinos allow individuals to give their names to the casino, the effect of which is to exclude them from claiming large winnings.81 The exclusion is reasonably enforceable because winnings over a
certain size require, at the time of cashing in one’s chips, that the winner
submit identification. If compulsive gamblers know that, despite being
optimistic, they cannot win big because the casino can lawfully refuse to
pay, the gamblers may be able to resist the temptation to gamble. Of
course, self-exclusion works better if it is more fail-safe—Leitzel reports
that casinos in some nations check identification at the door, excluding
anyone who has signed up to be excluded.82 Of course, the individuals
who choose these self-commitment mechanisms must be sophisticated
about their own present biases, anticipating at T0 that, absent commitment, they will succumb to temptation at T1 and regret it at T2. But individuals who are naïve about their present bias will not choose selfexclusion (except with an incentive, as discussed below).
We can apply what Ayres and Leitzel say about self-commitment to
the conditions of probation and parole discussed above. Alcoholics or
drug addicts might prefer that the judge hold the threat of prison over
their head as a means of inducing them to attend Alcoholics or Narcotics
Anonymous meetings or other drug treatment. Individuals who know
they cannot control themselves when faced with the immediate prospect
of stealing cash or punching an old high school rival might also prefer the
condition that they abstain from employment offering easy access to cash
or steer clear of a rival’s residence. The physical and temporal space
maintained between the individual and the cash or enemy is a commitment device. The same is potentially true of the racist told to stay out of
Hispanic neighborhoods, the pro-life activist told to avoid abortion clinics, or the sex offender told to stay off the Internet. Of course, the naïve,
present-biased offenders do not prefer conditions because they believe
they do not need them, so it is desirable that courts do not require consent to impose conditions.
Nonetheless, the possibility that some would consent to these conditions might imply that stronger self-exclusion options could be offered to
individuals, by letting them opt into criminal penalties even if they have
committed no crime. Instead of waiting until the individual commits a
crime and has a no drinking or no gambling requirement imposed as a
condition of probation or parole, the state might give the individual who
has not committed a crime the option of submitting to such a requirement—no drinking or no gambling—as a condition of avoiding some
punishment (e.g., a night in jail). The sophisticated, present-biased per80.

See Jim Leitzel, Big Ideas: Self-Denial as Policy, MILKEN INST. REV., First Quarter 2008, at

81.
82.

Id. at 78.
Id.

76.
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son would welcome the opportunity for commitment, but of course the
naïve present-biased person would not. This is unfortunate because the
sophisticated person is precisely the one who might find alternative
commitment mechanisms without the government’s assistance. One solution would be for the government to pay individuals to submit to such
conditions.83 Naïve individuals, who believe they will never be successfully tempted, would be happy to accept payment to subject themselves to
conditional punishment. Yet once they have entered the contract, they
have brought about the conditions that may produce successful selfcommitment.
There are serious ethical concerns with a policy of paying people to
take risks they are known to underestimate, especially for criminal sanctions. When the condition fails to deter some individuals, as it inevitably
will, the government will punish them to maintain the credibility of its
commitments (moreover, the proposal might dilute the ability of criminal
punishments to express condemnation for wrongful and culpable acts, if
the same punishments were given to people who committed no such
acts). But as unseemly as this is, one must compare it to the paternalistic
status quo where the state punishes individuals for drug use despite their
never having opted into a regime of punishment. Laws even punish individuals who rationally have no reason to avoid the drugs they are using
because they seem able to avoid becoming addicted to them. Thus, as
much as I hesitate to recommend the policy, it is not obviously worse
than the status quo.
III. CONCLUSION
Most of the policy discussion of present bias (or weakness of will or
bounded self-control) addresses the regulation of credit and savings. But
the inconsistency of time preferences has wider implications, especially
for criminal law. Present bias changes the optimal definition of crime,
but only through its possible effect on the timing of arrest, which has
more effect on deterrence than has been acknowledged. Present bias reveals overlooked benefits from undercover operations and defensive
precautions against crime, including the victim’s use of defensive force,
and helps to explain otherwise puzzling conditions of probation and parole, addiction, and the self-control mechanisms for dealing with addictive behavior. The criminal law seems to treat some offenders as if they
suffered from present bias, though there is room for a more systematic
application of these policy insights.

83. Here, I follow O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 79, who propose paying people to opt into
“sin” taxes, as on fatty foods like potato chips. The naïve underestimate their time-inconsistent, future
consumption of potato chips and therefore will take the payment. Once they opt into the taxes, they
will consume fewer potato chips.
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